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Some Details of Growth
WE HAVE sketched the bolder outlines of Soviet industrial growth, and
we must now take up the task of filling in the more important details.
It is inevitable in a large study like this one that details will be slighted
and perhaps even distorted, for they are subordinate to the primary
objective.This chapter should therefore be looked upon as simply an
introduction to the many highly special topics in Soviet industrial
development that deserve careful study, much more careful than we can
give.
The discussion will proceed chronologically, attention being directed
in turn to the pre-Plan period, the prewar Plan period, and finally the
postwar period. In each case, we shall try to present the basic charac-
teristics of industrial development over the years in question. Definitive
treatment must be left to others.
The Pre-Plan Period
It is difficult to trace out the year-to-year developments in Soviet industry
from the revolution to the beginning of the Plan period because data on
output are available for only a relatively small sample of industries and
most of them refer solely to large-scale production. The latter factor
means that production indexes (see Table 47 and Chart 18) probably
overstate the rates of both declines and rises in output, though the degree
of overstatement must remain unknown.Despite such qualifications,
there is little doubt about the general nature of the movements of industrial
production during this period.
The year 1913 is widely used, in both Soviet and Western analyses of
economic developments in the Soviet Union, to represent prerevolutionary
conditions.It is interesting to note, therefore, that industrial output had
not reached its prerevolutionary peak in that year:it was significantly
higher in each of the three succeeding years, if our indexes are to be
believed.During 1917, the year of the revolution, industrial output
dropped sharply, by something on the order of 17 per cent. This was,
however, a moderate decline compared with what was to follow while
the civil war was in progress: during 1918 the decline was on the order
of 47 per cent and during 1919, 40 per cent. The bottom was reached in
1920, when industrial output was apparently less than a fifth of the level
of 1916, and only a slight recovery was made in 1921. The decline in
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output was general throughout all segments of industry: over the period
191 3—1921, output declined in fifty-one out of fifty-four industries for
which data are available.'
With the end of the civil war and the initiation of the New Economic
Policy in 1921, there began a rapid recovery in industrial growth. The
TABLE 47























SOURCE: Table D-1. Interwar Soviet territory
rise was on the order of 46 per cent during 1922, 23 per cent during 1923
and 1924, 38 per cent during 1925,25per cent during 1926,and11 per
cent during 1927. As in the case of the decline, the recovery was general:
over the period 1921—1928, output rose in fifty-four out of fifty-five
industries for which data are available.2 Our production indexes indicate
1Seeoutput series in Tabie B-2. The three exceptions are corundum and emery,
peat, and lignite.
The decline in output was less pronounced for small-scale industry than for the total,
one source estimating that small-scale employment fell no lower than 40 per cent of its
prerevolutionary level (V. A. Tikhomirov, "Promyslovaia kooperatsiia na sovremennom
etape" [Producer Cooperatives at the Present Stage],Vestnik promyslovoi kooperalsii
[Bulletin of Producer Cooperativesj, 1931, No. 8, P. 3). See the detailed discussion in
Adam Kaufman, "Small-Scale Industry in the Soviet Union," NBER (in press),
Chapter 4.
2Seeoutput series in Table B-2. The exception is oil shale.
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CHART18
Production Indexes for Industrial Materials:
Soviet Union.1913—1928
Source: Table 47.
thatindustrial output had about recovered to its 1913 level by 1927 and
1928, but the indexes do not fully reflect the deterioration in quality of
many commodities, particularly consumer goods, discussed earlier in
Chapter 3.It is therefore very doubtful that the 1913 level of industrial
output had been reached on the eve of the First Five Year Plan;it is
virtually certain that the prerevolutionary peak had not been reached.
As would be expected, output showed a net rise in some areas over the
entire pre-Plan period and a net decline in others. The following in-
creases were apparently registered (see Table 53): agricultural machinery,
151 per cent;consumer durables, 58 per cent;fuel and electricity,
50 per cent; chemicals, 46 per cent; andtextiles and allied products,
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and allied products, 16 per cent;construction materials, 12 per cent;
ferrous metals, 12 per cent; transportation equipment, 10 per cent; and
nonferrous metals, 3 per cent. Output increased by 43 per cent in the
case of machinery and equipment and by 8 per cent in the case of
intermediate industrial products, while it decreased by 3 per cent in the
case of consumer goods.
Output per man-hour in all industry rose by 37 per cent over the
pre-Plan years, and output per person engaged by 11 per cent, the latter
reflecting a rise of varying magnitude in every industrial group (see
Table 40). The increases in output per person engaged were, in order:
ferrous and nonferrous metals, 33 per cent;construction materials, 19
per cent;fuel and electricity, 18 per cent; food and allied products,
12 per cent; machinery and allied products, 11 per cent;textiles and
allied products, 9 per cents and chemicals, I per cent.Moreover, the
improvement in labor productivity applied to small- as well as large-
scale industry (see Table 52). As we noted in the preceding chapter,
improved productivity accompanied a substantial reduction in hours of
work, at least in large-scale industry.3
The First and Second Five Year Plans
DISAPPEARANCE OF SMALL-SCALE INDUSTRY4
The boundaries of industry are seldom clear, particularly during the
early stages of industrialization. Up to the beginning of the Plan period,
a large fraction of Russian industrial output was produced in handicraft
shops and similar small establishments, and much of what appears in
official statistics to be an increase in output during the succeeding years
was essentially a transformation of this small-scale production into
factory production.Some of the transformation was, indeed, more
statistical than real: the definition of factory, or large-scale, production
was expanded to incorporate what was formerly treated as small-scale.
The nature of developments during the early part of the Plan period
cannot be understood without taking account of the changing role of
small-scale industry.
There is no way of knowing exactly what happened to definitions of
large-scale industry between 1928 and 1933. The general boundary line
between large- and small-scale establishments had been set in the Tsarist
period: if sixteen or more persons were employed along with mechanical
8SeeTables A-2 1 through A-23 and the surrounding text in Appendix A.
This section is based on the previously cited report by Adam Kaufman.
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power, or thirty or more without it, the establishment was considered
large-scale.5 Over time, this general rule was supplanted in some indus-
tries by special qualifications adapted to the peculiar conditions of those
industries.6These were, however, insignificant exceptions compared
with those introduced during the early part of the Plan period.
The pressure to show rapid rates of growth led to statistical juggling
of various sorts, some tailored to special industries (as flour milling,
bread baking, and shoemaking) and others to industry in general. For
instance, all state-owned bakeries, whether large or small, came to be
counted as large-scale, and most of the village bakeries became state
owned. Similarly, all flour mills with at least five grinding units came to
be counted as large-scale. A general rule was laid down that all enterprises
under the jurisdiction of a Union Republic ministry were to be counted
as large-scale, whether they met any other requirements or not. Hence
the picture of what actually happened to forms of industrial organization
must remain somewhat hazy. Even so, there is little doubt of an appreci-
able decline in the relative importance of genuinely small-scale industry
over this period.
Related to this shift from small- to large-scale production was a de-
finitional expansion of "industry," to bring within its scope a number of
activities that had previously been classified elsewhere. These activities
included logging, fishing, and various types of food processing carried on
in agricultural communities, such as meat slaughtering, processing of
dairy products, milling and cracking of grain, and extracting of vegetable
oils.These were for the most part small-scale activities that were to be
incorporated statistically into "industry," in many cases without any
essential change—at least initially—in the form of productive organization.
A brief summary of the statistical record of small-scale industry is
presented in Tables 48 through 50.Considerable allowance should be
made for possible error of unknown magnitude and direction, since the
statistical foundations are weak. During the Tsarist period, virtually no
statistics were collected by the central government for this segment of
industry, and estimates of the role of small-scale industry are based
ultimately on data collected by the local and provincial councils (zern.stva).
It should not be assumed that these data are less reliable than those
collected by the Tsarist government; on the contrary, there was generally
The Russian word for qualification is tsenz. Hence the large-scale establishments
meeting the described qualifications have been often characterized, through loose trans-
lation, as belonging to the "census industry."
6Fora summary of changes during the Soviet period before the plans, see A. Yezhov,
Soviet Statistics (translated from the Russian), Moscow, 1957, pp. 12 if.
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TABLE 48
PERSONS ENGAGED IN LARGE-SCALE AND SMALL-SCALE INDUSTRY :a
SOVIET UNION, SELECTED YEARS, 1913—1933
(full-time equivalents)
Thousands Per Cent
Large-Scale Small-Scale Large-Scale Small-Scale
Industry Industry Industry Industry
1913 2,864 2,942 49 51
1927 2,726 2,098 57 43
1928 2,971 2,408 55 45
1929 3,297 2,232 60 40
1933 8,062 591 93 7
SouRcE: Table C-i and Kaufman, "Small-Scale Industry," Table A-2.
a Includingfishing and logging but excluding repair shops.
TABLE 49
PERSONS ENGAGED IN LARGE-SCALE AND SMALL-SCALE SECTORS OF SELECTED INDUSTRIES:
SOVIET UNION, 1927, 1929, AND 1933
1927 1929 1933
Large-Small- Large-Small- Large-Small-
Scale Scale Scale Scale Scale Scale
SectorSector SectorSector SectorSector
THOUSANDS
Metal products 119 188 150 140 413 9
Wood products 23 162 34 160 249 105
Knitted goods 18 48 47 56 156 36
Garment industry 50 278 114 218 403 33
Fur processing 3 31 8 25 41 2
Boots and shoes 27 303 77 240 239 44
Flour and groats 49 118 41 79 59 115
Vegetable oil 12 17 16 18 20 7
Total 301 1,145 487 936 1,580 351
PER CENT
Metal products 39 61 52 48 98 2
Wood products 12 88 18 82 70 30
Knitted goods 27 73 46 54 81 19
Garment industry 15 85 34 66 92 8
Fur processing 9 91 24 76 95 5
Boots and shoes 8 92 24 76 84 16
Flour and groats 29 71 34 66 34 66
Vegetable oil 41 59 47 53 74 26
Total 21 79 34 66 82 18
SOURCE: Kaufman, "Small-Scale Industry," Table A-2.
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TABLE 50
ESTIMATED PERCENTAGE OF VALUE OF OUTPUT, VALUE ADDED,
AND EMPLOYMENT ACCOUNTED FOR BY SMALL-SCALE INDUSTRY :a
SOVIET UNION, SELECTED YEARS, 1913—1933
(per cent)
Value of Output Value Added Employmentb
1913 34 50
1927 31 30 43
1929 26 26 40
1933 8 7
SouRcE: Table C-2 and Kaufman, "Small-Scale Industry," Table A-3.
aIncludinglogging and fishing but excluding repair shops.
Persons engaged in industry expressed in full-time equivalents.
a higher level of statistical competence in these local activities than in the
central government.7Nevertheless, the statistical investigations raise
many problems of comparability of data, uneven and incomplete
coverage, and the like.
During the 1920's, while the Soviet authorities were deliberating on
methods of directing the economy, an effort was made to gather compre-
hensive statistics on small-scale production, and also to collate and
interpret such statistics as were available for the late Tsarist period.
Five censuses of small-scale industry were conducted during the 1920's,
the two most comprehensive covering the years 1926/27 and 1928/29.
These censuses contain data on value of output, value added, and employ-
ment.It is almost certain that these data are understated because it
in the political and economic interests of the small-scale producers
to underreport, and the generally poor state of business records in this
sector made it impossible to correct the underreporting.Moreover,
coverage was incomplete in that many of the small-scale activities not
then considered as within industry, but later incorporated, were not
surveyed.
The downward bias in data is acknowledged in the following official
comment on the census covering 1928/29:8
It is necessary to note a certain understatement of the data for the
capitalist sector [i.e., establishments hiring at least three employees].
The understatement arises from the tendency of the private entre-
preneur to conceal the actual volume of his output, the extent of labor
See, e.g., Bernard Pares, A History of Russia, rev. ed., New York, 1944, p. 402.
8Narodnoekhoziaistvo SSSR [The USSR National Economy], Moscow, 1932, p. 647,
as quoted in Gregory Grossman, Soviet Statistics of Physical Output of Industrial Commodities:
Their Compilation and Quality, Princeton for NBER, 1960, p. 43.
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employment, his receipts, etc., which has had a particular impact on
the data due to the coincidence of the census period with intensive
collectivization [of agriculture] in a number of regions. The under-
recording in the private sector is partly compensated by the inclusion
of data on home-workers, under the putting-out system, in the private
capitalist sector.
While this statement is directed to a very small segment of small-scale
industry, it would seem to apply to the entire private sector, which,
despite understatement, accounted for 75 per cent of all employment in
small-scale industry at this time.9
The most satisfactory way to picture the disappearance of small-scale
industry is through trends in employment. We may look first at persons
engaged in industry adjusted to a full-time basis and covering industry
(except repair shops) as ultimately defined in the Plan period (see
Table 48). We note that between 1913 and 1928, employment fell in the
small-scale sector from 2.9 to 2.4 million, while it rose only slightly in the
large-scale sector from 2.9 to 3.0 million.Over the next five years,
employment declined precipitously in the small-scale sector (from 2.4 to
0.6 million) while rising even more sharply in the large-scale sector
(from 3.0 to 8.1 million); hence total employment also rose substantially
(from 5.4 to 8.7 million). During the span of five years, the share of
employment accounted for by the small-scale sector fell from 43 to 7
per cent.In large part this was, as already mentioned, a statistical
mirage:the same thing was merely being called by a different name.
But the figures also reflect a radical shift in the structure of industry, as
can be seen from the fact that the increase in employment in large-scale
industry was 3.3 million greater than the decrease in small-scale industry.
The expanded employment in industry came, of course, from several
sources, including additions to the labor force, displaced rural labor, and
unemployed and underemployed labor.'° There had been a considerable
See Kaufman, "Small-Scale Industry," Table 9.
10Accordingto one Russian source (I. Berlin and Ia. Mebel', "Strukturnye sdvigi v
naselenii i proletariate" [Structural Changes in the Population and the Proletariat],
Voprosy truda [Labor Questions], 1932, No. 11—12, p. 23), there was a net increase of
6.9 million in hired urban workers over 1927—193 1, recruited as follows from the specified
sources (millions):
Current urban labor force
Self-employed 1.2
Unemployed and others 0.8
Urban entrants into labor force 2.1
Rural entrants into labor force 2.8
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degree of underemployment in small-scale industry: the average number
of weeks worked was roughly twenty-four in 1926/27, nineteen in 1927/28,
and sixteen in 1928/29.11 For large-scale industry, the average number
of weeks worked was, by contrast, forty-four in 1927/28.12 Hence, in
1928 the labor employed in small-scale industry (2.4 million full-time
equivalents) represented a potential employment of roughly 5.6 million,
or a potential addition to employment of 3.2 million, on the basis of the
average work-year then prevalent in large-scale industry.
While the trends in employment give a general view of what
to small-scale production, they are somewhat misleading in indicating
changes in the share of real output accounted for by that sector. Lab'
was probably less productive in small-scale than in large-scale industry,
and therefore the fraction of labor employed by small-scale industry,
even when corrected to a full-time basis, probably overstates the fraction
of output attributable to it.13 At the same time, value of output and value
added, the other two measures that are available, tend to understate the
fraction, since sales of small enterprises were probably underreported and
theircosts of materials probably overreportedfor reasons already
mentioned. There is also probably less double counting contained in
value of output for small-scale than for large-scale enterprises, since the
former tended to be more integrated than the latter.
Estimates of all three types are given in Table 50. From this evidence
it seems reasonable to say that the share of industrial production accounted
for by small-scale establishments declined from roughly a third in 1928 to
roughly a twelfth in 1933.
Changes in output over 1928—1933 are given in Table 51 for twenty-
seven products for which small-scale production can be estimated.
Small-scale production declined in every case, while large-scale produc-
tion declined in only eight cases (red lead, window glass, hard leather,
11Totalweeks worked (Tikhomirov in V,stnik promyslovoi kooperatsii, 1931, No. 8, p. 3,
and Melkaiapromyshlennost'SSSR po dannym vsesoiuznoi perepisi 1929 gQda [Small-Scale
Industry in the USSR According to Data from the All-Union Census of 1929], Moscow,
1932—1933, Vol. I, p. 6) divided by persons engaged (Statisticheskii spravochnik SSSR za
1928god[USSR Statistical Handbook for 1928], Moscow, 1929, P. 487; Plan, 1935,
No. 8, P. 12; and Melkaia promysiziennost', p. 6).
12Averagenumber of days worked (266 according to Stitisticheskoe obozrenie [Statistical
Review], 1929, No. 12, Pp. 88 f) divided by six.
18Small-scaleproduction was most important in industries characterized by a relatively
low net output (value added) per worker. In these industries, it is doubtful that the net
output per worker was significantly higher in large-scale than in small-scale entcrpriscs;
such technological and organizational advantages as the former may have enjoyed were
probably offset by longer hours of work in the latter. Net output per worker was probably
lower for small-scale than for large-scale industry as a whole because employment was more







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































0SOME DETAILS OF GROWTH
flour, soap, low-grade tobacco, linen fabrics, and woolen and worsted
fabrics).Declines in the small-scale sector were not fully matched by
increases in the large-scale sector in six cases (soft leather, vegetable oil,
meat, boots and shoes, cotton fabrics, and felt footwear). In the remain-
ing twelve cases, the declines were more than matched by increases in
the large-scale sector, but in all but two cases (canned food and pure silk
fabrics) the decline amounted to at least 10 per cent of the increase.
These data show that it can be very misleading to measure growth in
output over this early part of the Plan period on the basis of large-scale
production alone.
TABLE 52
INDEXES oi' OUTPUT, EMPLOYMENT, AND OUTPUT PER PERSON
ENGAGEDINLARGE-SCALEAND SMALL-SCALEINDUSTRY:
SOVIETUNION, BENCHMARK YEARS, 1913—1933
1913 1928 1933
TOTAL INDUSTRY
Outputof industrial materialsa 100 100 137
Personsengagedb 100 92 149







Output 100 105 158
SOURCE: Tables48 and D-1; Kaufman, "Small-Scale Industry," Table A-6.
a1928weights.
bMeasuredin full-time equivalents.
The movements of production and labor productivity in large- and
small-scale industry are represented in Table 52. Output is measured by
industrial materials because more comprehensive coverage is not possible
on the basis of available data.Small-scale production declined by 14
per cent between 1913 and 1928 and by 73 per cent between 1928 and
1933, while large-scale production was growing over the same periods by
7 and 71 per cent. The movements in labor productivity were in the
opposite direction, however: output per person engaged rose by 58 per
cent in small-scale industry between 1913 and 1933, but fell by 35 per
cent in large-scale industry.It is impossible to determine how much of
this was due to shifting of industries from one category to the other and
how much to other factors.
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GENERAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS
According to our moving-weight index for all products (Table
Chart 19), industrial output grew at an average of 12.1 per cent
CHART19



















Textiles and allied products
Food and allied products
Therewas an acceleration in growth from












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.SOME DETAILS OF GROWTH
TABLE 54
AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH RATES OF OUTPUT, ALL INDUSTRY AND INDUSTRIAL GROUPS:














Industrial materials 6.8 11.8 3.2 —9.4 16.0 9.0
All products 8.8 14.6 3.7 —6.0 8.3 9.6
All civilian products 8.8 13.2 0.7—14.8 26.4 7.7
Intermediate products 16.5 13.7 3.2 —11.2 21.3 9.0
Ferrous metals 11.0 22.2 1.0 —9.0 17.8 11.2
Nonferrous metals 19.4 23.5 14.2 —6.0 15.8 13.2
Fuel and electricity 21.1 15.7 8.6 —4.3 13.1 9.6
Chemicals 16.6 16.2 —0.4—17.8 35.8 7.7
Construction materials 12.7 6.3 —0.7 —14.0 24.3 8.5
Machinery and equipment 31.5 30.7 —11.2 —25.5 58.3 2.6
Transportation equipment 44.0 41.1 —8.0 —24.2 49.9 1.2
Agricultural machinery 19.4 1.4 —23.4—31.9 92.8 5.1
Consumer goods 0.7 9.4 2.9—15.5 20.3 10.0
Food and allied products 3.1 10.0 0.7 —12.1 15.5 8.9
Textiles and allied products —1.8 7.6 5.1—17.0 21.0 9.0
Consumer durables 45.3 39.0 —14.3 —34.8 85.5 23.1
Civilian and military machinery
and equipment 37.la 8.1 14.2 —10.6 9.7
Military products b 123.6a 30.1 23.3 —30.3 22.8
SOURCE: Table 53. Average annual growth rates calculated from data in terminal years by the
compound interest formula.
a1933instead of 1932.
b Output negligible in 1928.
for 1928—1932 and 14.6 per cent for At the same time, the
growth rates for individual industries were much less widely dispersed for
the later years than for the earlier ones (see Chart 20).
It should be recalled at this point that there was widespread deteriora-
tion in the quality of products during these years, most pronounced in
the field of consumer goods and over the period 1928—1932. This means
that production indexes tend to exaggerate rises and understate declines
in output, and in some cases, as consumer goods, the bias is very sub-
stantial. Thus, although our index shows the output of food and allied
products as increasing by 13 per cent from 1928 through 1932, it is
probable that output, measured in terms of some standard quality,
actually declined.Similarly, the decline in output of textiles and allied
products was probably greater than the recorded 7 per cent.
14Forall civilian products, the average annual growth rate was 11.2 per cent for 1928—
1937, 8.8 per cent for 1928—1932, and 13.2 per cent for 1932—1937;for industrial
materials, 9.6, 6.8, and 11.8 per cent; for finished civilian products, 10.3, 6.6, and 13.6
per cent.
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TABLE 55
AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH RATES OF OUTPUT PER UNIT OF LABOR,




All products 1.3 6.7 —5.8 —0.1 7.1
All products —1.5
OUTPUT PER PERSON ENGAGED
7.0 1.4 0.1 5.4
Ferrous and nonferrous metals —2.7 21.8 3.2 —1.4 8.9
Fuel and electricity 5.1 14.7 3.5 —0.1 5.4
Fuel 2.8 11.2 2.3 —0.2 4.9
Electricity —1.2 14.5 7.4 1.0 7.7
Chemicals —5.5 14.4 —5.7 5.5 —0.5
Construction materials . —7.4 9.2 —5.8 0.4 4.1
Wood materials —6.2 3.6 —3.8 0.9 1.5
Mineral materials —12.0 35.8 —13.2 —1.4 5.5
Machinery and allied products —2.1 28.7 4.6 —1.3 5.9
Civilian machinery and
equipment 17.5 3.5 0.6 4.4 —2.0
Food and allied products —4.1 5.1 —0.9 0.2 7.3
Textiles and allied products —2.9 3.8 2.6 0.8 3.7
SOURCE: Table 40. Note that some industrial groups have a different coverage from that in Table
54. Average growth rates calculated from data for terminal years by the compound interest formula.
The broad structure of growth rates in the two periods 1928—1932 and
1932—1937 is presented in Table 54. Machinery and equipment showed
the most rapid growth in both periods, followed by intermediate products
and consumer goods. Growth retarded slightly for the first two categories
but accelerated sharply for consumer goods between the two periods.
Growth retarded in the case of six of the industrial groups listed (consumer
durables, transportation equipment, fuel and electricity, agricultural
equipment, chemicals, and construction materials) and accelerated in the
case of four (ferrous metals, nonferrous metals, food and allied products,
and textiles and allied products). The great disparity between growth
rates for nondurable consumer goods, on the one side, and for all other
goods, on the other, has been commented on many times before; at this
stage we need only remark that the disparity was greatest during 1928—
1932.Production of military end items began in earnest in the Second
Five Year Plan, output expanding about twenty-five times between 1933
and 1937.
Growth in output in the First Five Year Plan was achieved primarily
by expanding employment; in the Second, by improving output per











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































0SOME DETAILS OF GROWTH
poured into existing facilities, with a general reduction in output per
worker; simultaneously, new facilities were being built and equipped;
and, in the succeeding period, new workers were combined with new
facilities and equipment to raise both output and output per worker.
We observe that output per person engaged fell in eight out of nine
industrial groups during 1928—1933 (the exception being civilian machin-
ery and equipment); it rose in all nine groups during 1933—1937.
OUTPUT OF MACHINERY
A few special remarks on the growth of machinery industries seem to be
called for because of the great difficulties, already discussed, in devising
satisfactory measures of production. In particular, it might be thought
that the failure to include some of the more heterogeneous categories of
machinery in our production indexes causes an understatement of over-all
growth.Before facing that question, we should trace out the broad
lines of growth in transportation equipment and agricultural equip-
ment
The output of transportation equipment had fallen by about 10 per
cent between 1913—1928. With the growth of the automobile industry,
production rose rapidly thereafter and reached its interwar peak in 1938.
The average annual rate of growth during 1928—1937 was 42.3 per cent.
By contrast, the output of agricultural equipment had risen by about
150 per cent between 1913 and 1928; and although production continued
to rise, the growth rate—9.0 per cent a year during 1928—1937—was
much slower than for transportation equipment. Moreover, growth in
output was accounted for entirely by tractors: production of agricultural
equipment other than tractors shows a cyclical pattern, with a peak in
1930, a trough in 1933, and a second much lower peak in 1937 (see
Chart 21).Developments in this industry seem to be rather closely
related to agricultural policy, in particular to forced collectivization.
There was a very substantial growth in other segments of the general
machinery industry—electrical equipment, mining machinery, machine
tools, and so on—but itis impossible to devise satisfactory measures
of this growth. The illustrative production indexes we have constructed
for this part of the machinery industry show a growth rate roughly the
same as for transportation and agricultural equipment taken together.
Put another way, inclusion of these heterogeneous machinery items in a
general production index does not materially affect the movement of the
index over 1928—1937 (see Table 28).
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CHART21



























Machinery other than tractors
Source: Table 53 and Appendix 0.
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Growth was also very rapid for consumer durables—bicycles, cameras,
light bulbs, phonographs, radios, sewing machines, and motorcycles.
The primary explanation here is the extremely low level of production
at the beginning of the Plan period.
GROWTH CYCLES
The annual growth rate has a rather interesting cyclical pattern in each
of the periods 1928—1932 and 1932—1937, though it is not so pronounced
in the latter as in the former (see Table 56).In each period, the peak
TABLE 56
ANNUAL RELATIVES OP PRODUCTION, INDUSTRIAL MATERIALS












































annual percentage increase in output seems to come in the second year.
This finding is supported by behavior in individual industries.If we
define a "growth cycle" as existing if the annual growth rate reached a
peak in some year other than the terminal years of the period, and if we
restrict our attention to industries with annual output data covering the
entire period, fifty-seven out of eighty-six industries (or 66 per cent) had
a "growth cycle" during 1928—1932, and eighty-six out of 106 industries
(or 81 per cent) had one during 1932—1937. Moreover, the second year
contained the peak annual growth rate for 69 per cent of the industries
with a "growth cycle" during 1928—1932 and for 34 per cent of those with
a "growth cycle" during 1932—1937. No other year claimed a larger
percentage.'5
15Thesestatistics are calculated from output series in Table B-2.
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It is not clear that any mechanical significance should be attached to
these "growth cycles" since they are consistent with economic develop-
ments unique to each period. For example, the declines in annual growth
rates during the period 1928—1932 coincide more or less with intensive
collectivization of agriculture.Similarly, the declines in the period
1932—1937 seem to coincide with Stalin's political purges.'6 We shall
discuss later whether there is similar evidence of "growth cycles" during
the postwar years, for this would have an important bearing on the
normalcy of such behavior.
SUCCESS IN MEETING GOALS OF FIVE YEAR
The output targets set at the beginning of the First and Second Five
Year Plans turned out to be rather poor forecasts of events (see Chart 22
and Table 57). For half the products whose targets were listed in physical
terms, output reached less than 76 per cent of the target by the terminal
year of each plan; the percentage fulfillment would be even lower for
the First Plan if we used the maximum instead of the minimum targets.
Those products accounting for half the value added (evaluated in 1928
or 1955 rubles) of all listed products in each terminal year had an output
that was less than 85 per cent of the target. Finally, the total value added
achieved by all listed products was no more than 77 per cent of the
"planned" value, both values being expressed in 1928 or 1955 rubles.
Success in meeting planned targets varied from one sector of industry
to another, being generally poorest in nonferrous metals, chemicals,
construction materials, and consumer goods. Actual value added was
within 10 per cent of "planned" value in the cases of fuel and electricity
and agricultural machinery in 1932, and of miscellaneous machinery in
1937. It is interesting to note for agricultural machinery that actual value
added fell from 98 per cent of "planned" value in 1932 down to 53 per
cent in 1937.
lflTheymay also be related to mobilization for war. At least one Western economist,
Gregory Grossman, has argued that 1936 should be included with the following three
years to form the period of intensive mobilization ("Steel, Planning, and War Prepared-
ness in the USSR," Explorations in Entrepreneurial History, Vol. IX, No. 4, P. 231). This
view may be doubted. Although military expenditures did rise substantially in 1936,
this was largely due to rising prices following the discontinuance of widespread rationing.
If this factor is discounted, expenditures in 1936 seem to fall in line, with the rising trend
of military expenditures begun in 1934 (see G. F. Grinko, "The Financial Program for
1935," in Soviet Union 1935, Moscow and Leningrad, 1935, and idem, "Financial Program
of the USSR for 1936," in Second Session of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR,
Moscow, 1936).
Dataunderlying the discussion in this section are given in technical note 10 of
Appendix A.
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TABLE 57
FULFILLMENT OF FIVE YEAR PLANS, BY INDUSTRIAL GRoUP: SOVIET UNION, 1932, 1937, 1950, AND 1955
Percenta
Value
ge Fulfilled of Planned Percentage Fulfihle





All covered products 74 76 94 99 78 76 94 98
Intermediate products 79 81 104 101 80 80 101 99
Ferrous metals 73 88 107 102 74 87 106 101
Nonferrous metals 60 59 105 81 62 58 103 82
Fuel and electricity 92 88 106 103 95 88 104 104
Chemicals 63 76 96 102 68 78 93 105
Construction materials 73 66 95 90 75 69 93 88
Machinery and equipment 102 77 72 107 110 72 72 110
Transportation equipment 118 79 69
C 119 63 63
Agricultural machinery 98 53 98 126 98 84 102 126
Miscellaneous machinery
C 99 77 76 C 111 82 74
Consumer goods 60 62 91 91 65 68 89 93
Food and allied products 57 72 95 86 65 74 90 93
Textilesandalliedproducts 61 56 88 94 67 57 84 94
STANDARD PRODUCT COVERAGEd
AlL covered products 77 77 102 100 79 76 99 98
Intermediate products 82 83 104 101 83 80 100 99
Ferrous metals 73 89 106 102 73 88 106 101
Nonferrous metals 60 67 110 80 62 67 111 80
Fuel and electricity 92 86 108 104 95 85 105 104
Chemicals 72 83 89 107 72 83 89 107
Construction materials 78 69 87 88 79 68 87 87
Agricultural machinery 98 53 97 126 98 53 97 126
Consumer goods 61 61 88 90 62 63 90 89
Food and allied products 38 86 105 76 38 86 105 76
Textiles and allied products 65 57 85 94 70 57 86 94
SOURCE: Table A-46.
Relates to minimum planned goals for 1932.
b Largest number of products for which required data are available in each case, as follows:
Valued in Valued in





Planned output not published.
d Same sample of eighteen products in each case.
The Third Five Year Plan
GENERAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS
The course of industrial development changed abruptly during the period
1937—1940:our production indexes all show a sharp retardation in
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* Less than 0.5 per cent.
tothe indexes based on moving weights, the average annual growth rate
fell from 11.8 per cent for 1932—1937 to 3.2 per cent for 1937—1940 in the
case of industrial materials, from 13.6 to —2.0 per centin the case of
finished civilian products, from 13.2 to 0.7 per cent in the case of all
civilian products, and from 14.6 to 3.7 per cent in the case of all industrial
products. These rates do not tell the full story because there was a sub-
stantial gain in industrial production attributable to territorial expansion.
In order to interpret the economic development, one must keep in
mind the political disturbances of the period. The Great Purge of the
Communist Party directed by Stalin reached its zenith in 1937 and 1938,
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resulting in, among other things, a wholesale turnover of Soviet economic,
military, and political leaders.'8 Though it may be impossible to assess
the full impact of the purge, there is no doubt that it had an adverse
effect on industrial production.
Coupled with the purge was a program of war preparedness, involving
substantial diversion of resources from some segments of industry into
armaments. Again, for reasons to be elaborated, there is no way to
determine how much this mobilization effort had to do with the sharp
retardation in growth. Our data on labor productivity (Table 55) do
indicate that one apparent effect of disturbances was a significant decline
in output per man-hour in industry as a whole. Average annual hours
worked increased by about 25 per cent between 1937 and 1940 (see
Table A-23), and if this increase applied generally—as seems likely—
output per man-hour declined throughout all sectors of industry.
Growth in output retarded sharply in every industrial area, output
actually declining in the case of chemicals, construction materials,
machinery and equipment, and consumer durables (see Table 54 and
Chart 19). The slow rate of growth of the ferrous metals industry was
officially blamed for many of these troubles, and trouble in that area
was in turn blamed on inadequate development of material inputs such
as iron ore, manganese, refractory materials, and lime.19 In any case,
the retardation in growth was so pronounced that aggregate industrial
production would have grown very little—if at all—between 1937 and
1940, had it not been for territorial acquisitions. This seems to hold true
even after allowance is made for expanding military production, which
we now turn to consider.
See,e.g., A. F. Khavin, "Razvitie tiazheloi promyshlennosti v tretei piatiletke"
[The Development of Heavy Industry in the Third Five Year Plan], Istoriia SSSR
[History of the USSR], 1959, No. 1, PP. 25 if.In introducing a detailed discussion of the
effects of the purge on industrial personnel, Khavin says the following (p. 25): "... In
1936—1939, having wormed their way into J. V. Stalin's confidence, the sworn enemies
of the Party and the people Ezhov and Beria—hiding under Stalin's incorrect belief
that, as the Soviet Union moved closer to socialism, the class struggle would become
more and more intense—started purges of Party and governmental personnel, slandering
and annihilating many honest and devoted Party people. Among those purged were
many industrial executives.
"The new people put into executive position in industry often did not yet have sufilcient
experience. In 1937—1938, more than 5,000 new executives were in charge of enterprises,
trusts, and. chief administrations of heavy industry. Of the 4,000 young specialists who
finished technical colleges in the second quarter of 1938, 816 (or more than 20 per cent)
were sent directly from college to executive positions in industry. Of the students who
were graduated from mining colleges in 1939, fifty-four were appointed chief engineers
of mines, and seventy, chief mechanical or electrical engineers. Many workers with no
theoretical training were promoted to executive positions."
'-°Khavinin Istoriia SSSR, 1959, No. 1, pp. 26 f.
209SOME DETAILS OF GROWTH
THE MOBILIZATION EFFORT
The Soviet armament program was seriously under way by 1933 and
1934, production of conventional weapons already being large by stand-
ards of that day.2° Production rose sharply through 1937, multiplying
twenty-five times according to our estimates.Direct employment in
military industries had probably reached one million persons by 1937, or
about 9 per cent of all persons engaged in industry.2'
The expansion in military output continued at the pace of about 30
per cent a year over the Third Five Year Plan, output more than doubling
and employment about doubling in the course of three years.The
additional million persons employed represented about 8.5 per cent of
persons engaged in other industries in 1940. We might therefore suppose
that, had these resources not been diverted to military production,
civilian production would have risen by about 10 or 11 per cent instead
of the 2 per cent actually experienced. In that event, output of all products
would have grown no more than it did in the face of the armament
program. In other words, there is little evidence here that diversion of
resources to military production materially affected the over-all rate of
industrial growth.
There was, of course, a substantial growth in the size of the armed
forces over this period, military personnel rising from something less than
1.5 million in 1937 to something over 4 million inthe middle of 1941.
This increase of 2.5 million was much larger than the increase of about
900 thousand that took place during the Second Five Year Plan.22 The
accelerated build-up of the armed forces helps to explain why the industrial
labor force showed an increase of less than a million persons over 193 7—
1940 compared with more than 3.5 million over 1933—1937.Persons
engaged in industry increased by over 40 per cent in the latter period
but by only 7 per cent in the former (see Table A-20).
In any case, Soviet industry had by no means been put on a wartime
footing by the end of 1940. The full list of reasons cannot be known,
since the happenings of these years are cloaked in mystery, perhaps never
to be dispelled. Fewer data on output are available for 1939 than for
any other single year in the Plan period, except war years. The political
developments of that year were, of course, world shaking. The Hitler-
Stalin pact was concluded in August, followçd in September by the
20Seethe speeches by Grinko and Tukhachevsky in Soviet Union 1935. See also Heinz
Guderian, Panzer Leader, New York, 1952, p. 141, and John Scott, Behind the Urals,
Cambridge, Mass., 1942, pp. 106 f.
21Seenote d to Table A-20.
22Thesedata are taken from the annex to technical note 3 of Appendix A.
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German invasion of Poland and the start of World War II. In the wake
of German victory in Poland and in accord with the Hitler-Stalin pact,
the Soviet Union took possession of the Baltic States and about half of
Poland. The war against Finland was launched. From an economic
point of view, the gains from territorial acquisitions were substantial,
while the drain of the Finnish war was probably very slight. Yet there
is every indication from our indexes that industrial output increased by
only 4 per cent in 1939 and 2 per cent in 1940—altogether, by less than
the gains from territorial expansion. What happened?
One former Soviet official, Victor Kravchenko, has argued that the
mobilization effort faltered in 1939:23
The theory that Stalin was merely "playing for time" while feverishly
arming against the Nazis was invented much later, to cover up the
Kremlin's tragic blunder in trusting Germany.It was such a trans-
parent invention that little was said about it inside Russia during the
Russo-German war; only after I emerged into the free world did I
hear it seriously advanced and believed.It Was a theory that ignored
the most significant aspect of the Stalin-Hitler arrangement:the
large-scale economic undertakings which drained the USSR of the
very products and materials and productive capacity necessary for its
own defense preparations.
The simple fact is that the Soviet regime did not use the interval
following the Hitler-Stalin pact to arm itself effectively.I was close
enough to the defense industries to know that there was a slackening
of military effort after the pact. The general feeling, reflecting the
mood in the highest official circles, was that we could afford to feel
safe thanks to the statesmanship of Stalin. Not until the fall of France
did doubts arise on this score; only then was the tempo of military
effort stepped up again.
This view seems to be substantiated in an article by A. F. Khavin, a
Soviet historian, published in a professional journal in 1959
Nevertheless, in the years just before the war, the possibilities of
strengthening the defense capacities of the country were far from being
fully utilized.This was partly the result of J. V. Stalin's incorrect
assessment of the military and political scene on the eve of the war, of
23V.Kravchenko, I Chose Freedom, New York, 1952, p. 335. See also pp. 362 if.
24Khavin,in Istoriia SSSR, 1959, No. 1, Pp. 22 f.
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his obvious overconfidence in the pact with Germany.Socialist
industry had at its disposal productive forces and cadres that enabled
it to supply the Red army with the newest equipment. But it was not
fully mobilized in time.Old-style tanks and planes were no longer
produced, but the mass production of new types of military equipment
was slow to be mastered.
Therefore, at the beginning of the war, the Soviet air force had, for
instance, as many planes as the enemy force, but they were outmoded
and inferior to German planes.
While not addressing himself to the inadequacies of industrial prepara-
tion for war, the late Nikolai Voznesensky, former head of the Gosp Ian,
commented much earlier on the fact that full mobilization took place
only after war had started. He said :25
ThePatriotic War found Soviet war industry in the process of
introducing the production of new equipment, and the mass output of
war equipment was not organized as yet.Prior to the Patriotic War,
when the menace of Hitlerite Germany against the USSR was being
felt more and more, the Soviet government adopted as a precautionary
measure the "mobilization plan" with respect to ammunition for the
second half of 1941 and 1942, aiming at wartime conversion of industry
in the event of a war. The mobilization plan established a program of
ammunition production, and defined a program of industrial conversion,
especially for the machine-building industry, in the event of an attack
by fascist aggressors on the USSR.
In the very first days of the Patriotic War the mobilization plan
was transformed into an operational assignment for the expansion of
output in the most important—and the most capable of mass produc-
tion—branch of war industry: the manufacture of ammunition. The
machine-building, metallurgical, and chemical industries began an
intensive conversion from peacetime to wartime production.The
growth of war production was assured by the radical conversion of all
industry of the USSR for meeting the needs of the Patriotic War.
War industry, basing itself on all the productive capacity of the
country, rapidly mastered the production of modern war equipment
and changed the technological process of production to the mass
continuous output of aircraft, tanks, weapons, and ammunition.
25N.A. Voznesensky, The Economy of the USSR During World War II (translated from
theRussian),Washington, 1948, pp. 46 fone intervening paragraph omitted.
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The ambitious plans for expanding output in1941, summarized
earlier in Tables 1 and 2, also suggest that industrial mobilization was
not preoccupying Soviet leaders even as late as 1940. Large increases in
output were planned throughout industry, in the sector of consumer
goods as well as elsewhere.
It would seem from these lines of evidence that the sharp retardation
in growth evident for the period 1937—1940 is not explained by industrial
mobilization. The years most needing explanation are 1939 and 1940,
when industrial output adjusted to constant territorial coverage seems
not to have increased at all despite the fact that the mobilization effort
seems to have faltered and even diminished. The Great Purge undoubtedly
had more to do with slowing down growth, and even that may not be a
full explanation.
Postwar Industrial Developments
EXTENT OF WAR DAMAGE
The Soviet Union suffered very heavy losses during World War II, and
this is shown nowhere more graphically than in what happened to popula-
tion, which according to estimates derived from official data dropped
roughly 24 million between 1940 and 1945, whereas in the absence of
war it might well have risen by as much as 15 million. The losses in
output were also large, industrial production (for example) declining
precipitously to an unknown iow point around 1943 while large areas
of the Soviet Union were being occupied by German troops.In 1945
industrial output stood, according to our indexes, at 83 per cent of its
1940 level, and this is probably an understatement of the decline because
of the tendency of indexes to exaggerate wartime production. In 1946,
after the sudden and sharp demobilization, output stood at less than 60
per cent of the 1940 level.Industrial and residential property were
damaged and destroyed on a large scale.Even with an abundance of
statistical detail at our disposal, we could hardly expect to make an
adequate and meaningful assessment of the full economic significance of
these war losses; faced as we are with only shreds of evidence, we can
make only crude guesses.Even then we would have touched on only
one—in most respects, a minor—aspect of war losses, namely, "economic"
damage.
It is, nevertheless, important that we form some notion of the magnitude
of the net economic handicap placed on Soviet industry in resuming its
development in the postwar years, so that we may have a better basis for
interpreting recent economic performance.One important thing to
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recognize is that economic aid received during the war and "reparations"
collected afterward did mitigate losses significantly.
It has been estimated that Lend-Lease shipments to the Soviet Union
averaged about $3 billion annually.26 The significance of this aid is
revealed by noting that Soviet production in 1940 of the fifty items in-
cluded in our index of industrial materials amounted to only $3.6 billion
when valued in U.s. 1939 prices (see Table D-7). The total production
of Soviet industry apparently amounted in 1940 to about $8.8 billion.27
Annual Lend-Lease aid would seem to have been roughly a third of
prewar annual Soviet industrial output, about the internal decline in
industrial output. To this extent, current losses were being offset.
It is much more difficult to assess the more permanent economic losses
in the form of property and manpower. On property we must reason
entirely by analogy with the United States, and then in only the crudest
way. According to Raymond Goldsmith's estimates, all reproducible
tangible assets of the United States as of the end of 1940 were worth
about $331 billion when valued at current replacement cost.28 As a very
rough guess, we might suppose that the stock of such assets in the Soviet
Union was about a fifth as large as in the United States, which would
give an estimate of $65 billion as the replacement value of Soviet repro-
ducible tangible assets in 1940, expressed in current American prices.29
26HarrySchwartz, Russia's Soviet Economy, 2nd ed., New York, 1954, P. 595.
27Thisestimate is reached as value added in dollars in 1928 (83.6 billion, as given in
Table 63) times the production index for all Soviet products (311 per cent of 1928),
deflated by the U.S. BLS wholesale price index for other than farm products and foods
(89.5 per cent of 1928).
28R.W. Goldsmith, D. S. Brady, and H. Mendershausen, A Study of Saving in the
United States, Vol. III, Princeton, 1956, p. 14.
The official Soviet statement of damages is 679 billion rubles or $128 billion
(Voznesensky, Economy of the USSR, p. 97).This is said to represent two-thirds of all
wealth in territories occupied by the Germans (ibid.), and that wealth is implied by other
statistics to have been from a third to a half of all wealth in the Soviet Union (ibid., p. 94).
Thus the losses are implied to be from a fifth to a third of total wealth. The numerical
estimate of losses cannot, therefore, be taken seriously; for even with the obviously high
estimates of the fraction of wealth lost, it would imply a total wealth of from $384 to
$640 billion. These figures bracket Goldsmith's estimate of $424 billion as the national
wealth of the United States in 1940.
Soviet statistics on wealth have recently been officially condemned as inadequate and
unreliable by V. Starovskii, present head of the Central Statistical Bureau, in his article,
"Novye zadachi sovetskoi statistiki" [New Tasks of Soviet Statistics], Kommunist [The
Communist], 1957, No. 14, p. 68. As to estimated war damage, Starovskii says:"At
the end of World War lithe fixed capital of all enterprises in formerly occupied territory
was re-assessed. The results of this work, done at various times, did not make it possible
to estimate fixed capital in comparable prices.Therefore, the government recognized
the necessity of bringing order to this matter."
In recognition of these shortcomings, a comprehensive census of capital was undertaken
in 1960, and the results have recently been published in Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1959
godu [The USSR National Economy in 1959], Moscow, 1960.
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We might further suppose, as a very rough guess, that a fifth to a
quarter of these assets were destroyed in war.30 The capital loss would
then be, on the basis of these crude assumptions, somewhere between
$13 and $16 billion. That is to say, new investment within that range
would have been required to restore the stock of tangible reproducible
assets to its prewar level. No account is, of course, taken of the retardation
in growth of capital that may have occurred as a direct consequence
of war.
With those general orders of magnitude in mind, let us now turn to
the question of "reparations" and see how they compare with this crude
measure of "loss." We have collected together scattered estimates of
reparations and aid given by a number of countries to the Soviet Union
over 1946—1953; details may be found in technical note 8 of Appendix A.
These fragments sum to at least $9 billion in 1938 U.S. prices, or to about
$21 billion in current U.S. prices. The latter may be compared with the
$12 billion given by the United States to Western Europe under the
Marshall Plan.
Our estimate of reparations to the Soviet Union does not include
requisitions to support Soviet occupation forces in Europe, confiscations
of industrial equipment dismantled before the end of the war, proceeds
from the so-called "joint companies" established in the satellite countries
of Eastern Europe, labor services of prisoners of war, or benefits from
differential trading prices (except in the case of Polish coal).Professor
Nicholas Spulber concludes in his authoritative study of postwar economic
developments in Eastern Europe that "the over-all contribution of these
areas to the Soviet Union of reparations, restitutions, etc., was much
more substantial than the value totals would suggest,"3' further stating32
that:
The cost of the war participation of Hungary, Romania, and Bul-
garia on the Nazi side has placed on them a burden of debt to Russia
for a period of not less than 12 years (1944—45—1956).First in the
form of reparations, second in the form of joint companies, which grew
mostly out of the German assets, and third in the form of the sale and
transfer of those assets back to those countries, the Soviet Union has
pressed its claims almost inflexibly.It is against this background that
30Thisis suggested by various data given in A. Bergson et al., "Postwar Economic
Reconstruction and Development in the U.S.S.R.," Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science, May 1949, p. 53.
N.Spulber, The Economics of Communist Eastern Europe, Cambridge, Mass., 1957, p. 182.
32Ibid.,pp. 205 f.
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we should judge what the Soviet Union claims to have "given" these
countries.
In the nature of the case, we cannot make a precise and reliable
estimate of the total value of materials and property received by the
Soviet Union from other countries during the postwar period.It is
quite possible that our estimates of reparations represent no more than
half the total. Thus we can imagine a range of $9 to $18 billion in 1938
dollars, which may be compared with our estimate of $13 to $16 billion
as the Soviet ioss of capital during the war, also expressed in prewar
dollars.
The Soviet Union has not, of course, been able to make up for its
enormous loss of population—if; indeed, it makes sense to talk about
"making up" for such things. Most of these losses occurred among males
of working age and, because of lowered birth rates, among the younger
age cohorts of both sexes.Economically the result was an immediate
reduction in the labor force and a delayed retardation in its rate of growth
that was to set in a decade or so after the end of the war—i.e., around
1955. The reduction in the labor force was offset in part by the increased
participation of women and by the use of prisoners of war, who were
retained and employed on a large scale up to at least These have
been essentially temporizing measures, however; the permanent loss of
population has not been economically compensated for, if we assume—
as we should—that the lost population would have produced more than
enough to maintain itself.
In summary, then, the Soviet Union suffered heavy economic losses
in World War II.At the same time, various extraordinary measures
resorted to, such as confiscations of foreign materials and property and
employment of prisoners of war, considerably mitigated those losses and
may very well have fully offset property damage.
RECOVERY OF INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION, 1945—1950
Output recovered rapidly during the Fourth Five Year Plan (1946
through 1950), apparently reaching its peak prewar level by 1949.
Reconversion also occurred rapidly: according to our imperfect measures,
output of military products fell by 85 per cent in 1946 and total output by
32 per cent (see Chart 23).These declines are probably exaggerated,
however, to the extent that our indexes for 1945 overstate production
(see the concluding paragraph of the section on military products in
"Schwartz,Russia's Soviet Economy, pp.569if.
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Chapter 5).']?heshifting of resources was apparently completed before
1948, when military output apparently reached its low point for this
period—about 11 per cent of its 1945 level, according to our index—and
total output registered a level equal to its previous (exaggerated) 1945
peak.Military output rose sharply again in 1950 with the outbreak of
the Korean War, but it reached only about a sixth of its 1945 level.
Hence, over 1945—1950, the measured increase in output was larger for
civilian products (223 per cent) than for all products (49 per cent) or for
industrial materials (ill per cent). By 1950, output was 24 per cent
higher than the 1940 level for all products, 29 per cent higher for industrial
materials, and 45 per cent higher for civilian products.
Output per unit of laboi. was roughly the same in 1950 as in 1940,
according to our estimates (see Table 40). Such gains as occurred can
probably be attributed primarily to technological advances—resulting
from wartime experiences, including close contact with the Allies—since
it is doubtful that there was a significant increase in industrial capital or
improvement in worker's skills between 1940 and 1950. The largest rise
in ]abor productivity came in the machinery and chemicals sectors, with
smaller rises for electricity, wood construction materials, and textiles and
allied products. Labor productivity apparently declined for metals, fuel,
and mineral construction materials.
It would appear that Soviet industry was much more successful in
meeting planned goals at the end of the Fourth—and Fifth— Five Year
Plan than it had been in the First and Second (see Table 57). Whether
this is the result of improved performance or a gradual process of selecting
items easiest to plan—only eighteen products in the Fifth Plan appear in
all the other plans—is not clear. The estimated 1955 value added of
thirty-four planned industries—and value added fulfilled—amounted to
less than a sixth of the total value added of industry (see Tables A-43 and
A-46).
It is interesting to compare the postwar recovery of industrial output in
theSovietUnionwithrecovery in other countries that suffered considerable
war damage. This is done in Table 58 and Chart 24, where industrial
growth over recent years is shown for France, Japan, West Germany,
and the Soviet Union. Producti.on is measured for the first three countries
by their official indexes; for the Soviet Union, by our indexes for indus-
trial materials and for all products. Postwar economic developments have
not, of course, been the same in all these countries.In particular, the
economic recovery of both Japan and West Germany was held in check
by policies of the occupying powers until at least as late as 1948. In any
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CHART24
Indexes of Industrial Production in France, Japan, West Germany,
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to note that the over-all course of recovery (and
was similar in all these countries, when due
allowance is made for different circumstances. France showed a faster
growth than the SovietUnion from 1945/46 through 1950, and both
Japan and West Germany surpassed this record in a comparable five
years of recovery (1948—1953).Growth inall three countries has
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SOURCE; Table 53 and United Nations, Statistical Yearbook, 1959, New York, 1959.
Data for years not given in the latter source have been interpolated by indexes in
Statistical Yearbook, 1956 or 1957.
POSTWAR GROWTH, 1950—1955
During the Fifth Five Year Plan (1951 through 1955), industrial output
apparently grew faster than during the First Five Year Plan and slower
than during the Second—slower than during both the First and Second
taken together (see Table 54). In the case of food and textiles, however,
the growth was more rapid than during the First and Second Plans
together.Consumer goods outpaced industry as a whole in growth,
although, as we shall see, this was in part a result of the rearmament
program. Military production continued the expansion begun in 1950—
with a dip in 1953 and 1954, following the end of the Korean War and the
death of Stalin—and multiplied almost twice as much as all other
production.
In fact, industrial developments in the first two years seem to have been
dominated by military preparations. Output of civilian machinery and
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equipment fell by 15 per cent in 1951 and 6 per cent in 1952, while
military production was rising very rapidly.In view of behavior in
surrounding years, it seems likely that the sudden spurt in the growth of
consumer goods in 1951—output increasing by 17 per cent for foods,
20 per cent for textiles, and 29 per cent for consumer durables—was also
connected with the re-equipping of troops, whose strength more than
doubled between 1948 and
The end of the Korean hostilities and, particularly, the change of
government with Stalin's death clearly left their mark on economic
developments. Military production, by our measures, declined by 9 per
cent in both 1953 and 1954, though it apparently recovered its 1952 level
by 1955.As a counterpart, consumer goods and civilian machinery
outpaced all industry in growth over thislatter half of the Fifth
Plan, the growth rate of consumer goods falling sharply, however, in
1955.
Though there is some evidence of a "growth cycle" during the period
of postwar recovery (1945—1950), the picture is more confused for 1950—
1955. Out of 170 industries for which the needed output data are avail-
able, only eighty-eight (slightly more than half) show a "growth cycle"
in the latter period. That is, only about half the industries had a peak
rate of growth in some year other than 1951 or 1955. The distribution of
peak growth rates for all 170 industries is as follows:1951, fifty-one;
1952, nineteen;1953, thirty-four;1954, thirty-six; and 1955, thirty.35
These statistics cast further doubt on whether "growth cycles" might be
a standard phenomenon of the five year plan.
Output per man-hour apparently grew more rapidly during the Fifth
Five Year Plan than during either the Second or the Third (see Table 55).
The average annual growth rate for the Fifth Five Year Plan (7.1 per
cent) is considerably higher than the rates for both the entire Soviet
period (1.9 per cent) and the Plan period (1.7 per cent). In the case of
output per person engaged, the growth rate was faster than for the
First and Second Plans combined but slower than for the Second Plan
alone. For all industrial groups except food and allied products, output
per person engaged also grew at a slower rate than for the Second Five
Year Plan.For fuel, chemicals, mineral construction materials, and
civilian machinery, the growth rate was also slower than for the First and
Second Plans combined;for electricity, wood construction materials,
food and allied products, and textiles and allied products, it was faster.
84Seethe annex to technical note 3 of Appendix A.
All statistics are derived from the output series in Appendix B.
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TABLE 59
ANNUAL RELATIVES OF PRODUCTION, ALL INDUSTRY AND INDUSTRIAL GRouPs:
SOVIET UNIoN, 1950—1958
(percent)
Production as Percentage of PrecedingYear.
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958
Industrial materials 110 113 106 108 108 110
All products 115 114 109 106 109 110
All civilian. products 117 107 103 108 112 109 1088 1108 1048
Intermediate products 116 113 107 106 111 110
Ferrous metals 117 115 112 110 109 110 107 105 107
Nonferrous metals 116 118 117 110 109 114
Fuel and electricity 111 110 108 108 110 113 110 110 110
Chemicals 122 109 105 103 111 111 110 108 107
Construction materials 117 114 105 104 112 107 105 109 108
Machinery and
equipment 127 85 94 110 114 114 116 118 95
Transportation
equipment 120 75 95 119 112 111 105 103 107
Agricultural
machinery 146 106 91 97 116 118 133 138 83
Consumergoods 110 120 105 109 112 106 105 105 107
Food and allied
products 103 117 104 108 111 104 108 103 105
Textiles and allied
products 113 120 104 108 110 105 103 106 107
Consumer durables 128 129 114 121 133 120 112 106 111
Civilian and, military
machinery and
equipment 134 109 122 99 102 118
Military products 154 170 161 91 91 123 -___________
SOURCE: Table 53.
aDoesnot cover nonferrous metals and several other products (see Table A-5).
THE YEARS SINCE 1955
The Sixth Five Year Plan began with 1and ended less than two years
later in the fall of 1957, under circumstances suggesting that its goals
were too ambitious.36 After an interval of a year, a Seven Year Plan
36Thefollowing statement appeared in a resolution of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party issued in December 1956 ("On Completion of Work on Drafting
Sixth Five-Year Plan and on Policy of Drawing up Non-Specific Control Figures for
1956—1960 and Economic Plan for 1957," Current Digest of the Soviet Press, VIII, 52, 11,
original text in Pravda and Izvestia, December 25, 1956): "In drafting national economic
plans, the State Planning Commission, the State Economic Commission and the ministries
are not taking sufficient account of practical possibilities for supplying materials and
funds for plan assignments, are not providing for sufficient stocks of raw materials, fuel
and supplies and are allowing an excessive volume of construction, which creates added
strain in carrying out the plan." Abandonment of the Sixth Plan was announced in
Pravda, September26, 1957.
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was inaugurated to cover 1959 through 1965. On the basis of data
published since 1955, we have extended our production indexes for
industrial materials and all civilian products through 1958 as given in
Table 53•37
The output of industrial materials increased at an average annual rate
of 7.1 per cent over 1955—1958, compared with 9.0 over 1950—1955;
the output of all civilian products, at 7.4 per cent, compared with 7.7
per cent. Since the growth of industrial materials seems to have paralleled
closely the growth of all products over 1950—1955 (see Table 59), it is
TABLE 60
AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH RATES IN PHYSICAL. OUTPUTPLANNEDFOR 1955—1965




Iron ore 5.0 9.8 12.6 8.0
Pig iron 5.0 9.0 11.6 7.3
Steel ingots 5.8 9.2 10.6 6.9
Rolled steel 5.5 9.0 11.1 6.7
Electric power 11.2 13.9 13.3 11.6
Coal 6.4 9.3 8.4 4.1
Crude petroleum 5.0 7.0 13.4 12.7
Natural gas 14.6 13.4 9.3 32.5
Mineral fertilizer 12.5 17.1 11.7 11.2
Paper 5.5 7.2 9.3 6.3
Cement 6.6 9.7 17.1 13.2
Lumber 3.9 6.5 8.8 4.6
Window glass 3.5 4.1 5.4 8.2
Motor vehicles n.a. 13.6a 4.2 6.1
Butter 3.6 6.6 6.6 8.4
Vegetable oil 2.2 2.5 7.4 7.2
Meat slaughtering 2.1 3.3 9.2 11.2
Fish catch 2.4 4.5 9.3 5.5
Raw sugar 2.0 3.7 6.3 10.5
Boots and shoes 3.7 3.7 6.2 6.5
Cotton fabrics 2.0 3.0 8.7 3.9
Silk and rayon fabrics 5.7 14.3 32.3 10.9
Woolen and worsted fabrics 2.1 2.9 10.3 7.1
Hosiery n.a. 5.2b 10.4 4.9
Median 5.0 7.1 9.3 7.2
SOURCE: Table B-2; goals of the Seven Year Plan (taken as midpoints of announced
ranges) as given in Current Digest,XI,9, 3 if.Average annual growth rates calculated
from output in terminal years by the compound interest formula.
a1932—1955.
b 1933—1955.
" Because the published record of production has not been complete, we have had to
resort to some indirect procedures in extending the industrial materials indexes. They
and their possible effects are described in the technical note 3 of Appendix A, in the
text surrounding Table A-5.
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reasonable to suppose that it has continued to do so in more recent years.
Hence growth seems to have slowed down since the end of the Fifth
Five Year Plan, more so in the case of all products than in the case of
civilian products alone.It is, of course, too early to tell whether this
marks a trend or merely a fluctuation.
The official production index shows the same slowing down:an
average annual rate of 10.1 per cent for 1955—1958 compared with 13.1
per cent for 1950—1955 (see Table F-2). Moreover, the average annual
rate planned for the Seven Year Plan is 8.6 per cent, compared with
11.3 per cent for the Fifth Five Year Plan and 10.5 per cent for the Sixth.
The expected retardation holds generally for individual industries
reported on (Table 60). By Soviet measures and expectations, the rate
of growth in industrial production is retarding.
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